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Preliminares (PDF)

Introduction (PDF)

Chapter One. Legal Certainty in the Positivist Tradition: From Codification to Kelsenian Normativism (PDF)

I. Problem Statement and Delimitation

II. The Origins: The Corpus Iuris Civilis

III. The Renaissance: Thomas Hobbes and the Argument from Authority

IV. Consolidation: Enlightenment Positivism and Codification

1. Montesquieu and the Enlightenment Foundations of Judiciary

2. Beccaria and Legal Certainty in Criminal Matters

3. Overview of Codification and Exegesis

4. Savigny and the German Historical School

5. Bentham and Austin in the Enlightenment Context

V. Systematization: Hans Kelsen, the Normative Order and the Science of Law

VI. The Crisis: The Post-War Period and the Relativization of Legal Certainty at the Beginning of the 21st Century

Chapter Two. The Judicial Function in Classical Positivism: Continental Civil-Law and Common-Law Analytical Traditions (PDF)

I. Problem Statement and Delimitation

II. Premises of the Classical Model: Sources, Law and Certainty

1. Monism of State Sources and Legislative Omnipotence

2. French Codification as a Predictability Technique

3. Separation of Powers and Judicial Function in Montesquieu and Beccaria

III. The Judicial Function in the Continental Tradition

1. School of Exegesis as a Cult of the Legal Text

2. The Historical School and Savigny’s Criticism of Codification

IV. The Judicial Function in Classical Analytical Positivism

1. The British Common Law under Utilitarian Criticism

2. Austin and the Judicial Function in a Statutory Law System

V. The Crisis of the Classical Model and the Kelsenian Threshold of the Judicial Function

Chapter Three. Kelsenian Bases for the Interpretation of Law (PDF)

I. Problem Statement and Delimitation

II. The Concept of Legal Interpretation in Hans Kelsen

III. The Legal Significance of Human Conduct

IV. The Indeterminacy of Law

V. Value Judgments in the Legal System

VI. Final Reflection

Chapter Four. The Judicial Function in Hans Kelsen: Creation and Discretion (PDF)

I. Introduction: The Judicial Function in Hans Kelsen versus Classical Positivism and the Legal Argumentation Theories

II. The Judicial Function as a Producer of Legal Norms

III. The Judicial Function as Normative Self-Production and the System of Rules as a Frame of Reference

IV. The Coercive Nature of the Law by Judicial Order

V. Normative Production in the Absence of Norms and Range of Judicial Discretion

VI. The Production of General Rules by Judicial Bodies

VII. Final Reflection

Bibliography (PDF)